Why was I interested in interviewing Veronica? She is a Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy (Jurisprudence) at the School of Law, University of Surrey, within the Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences. Based in the Frank Whittle Building on the University’s main campus, her work sits at the intersection of legal, moral, and political philosophy. Drawing on the classical tradition—particularly Aristotelian practical reason—her research explores the nature of legal normativity, intentional action, and the relationship between law, value, and human agency. Her scholarship is widely recognised for advancing a non-reductionist account of law that emphasises the role of practical reasoning in shaping both legal institutions and responsible citizenship.
The interview is particularly compelling because it offers a rare and philosophically rich account of law that moves beyond technical debates and engages with fundamental questions about human action, value, and the common good. It combines rigorous theoretical reflection with concrete examples, making complex ideas—such as practical reason, structural injustice, and civic maturity—accessible without oversimplifying them. At the same time, it situates legal philosophy within broader concerns about education, democracy, and the challenges of contemporary society, including the impact of technology on public reasoning. The result is a thoughtful and wide-ranging conversation that speaks not only to scholars, but to anyone interested in how law can shape—and be shaped by—our shared pursuit of what is good and just.
Here is our exchange:
Where are you originally from, and what aspects of your childhood there most shaped who you are today?
I am originally from Caracas, Venezuela, and I came to England to pursue my master’s degree and doctorate. When I was growing up, Venezuela was very different from what it is today. It was a democratic and relatively prosperous country in which education was highly valued.
My childhood was deeply shaped by two central aspects of life there: family and religious celebrations, and a close connection to nature. Venezuelan culture places great importance on family bonds, communal gatherings, and vibrant traditions , and these experiences left a lasting imprint on me. At the same time, spending time in nature—something that was both accessible and cherished—helped shape my sense of reflection and appreciation for the world.
Together, these elements formed an important part of who I am today, grounding me in a strong sense of community, spirituality, and connection to my surroundings.
How would you describe your family environment growing up, and who were the most influential figures in your early life?
In the 1970s and 1980s, when I was just nine years old, my father was elected as a Venezuelan senator for the Social Christian Party (COPEI), a position he went on to hold for a further 25 years. A few years earlier, my mother had successfully competed for a position as a High Court judge in administrative law.
My home was an exciting place to grow up. There were frequent dinner parties and lively debates about politics, law, and justice. Venezuela had overthrown a dictatorship in 1958, and the oil industry was nationalised in the 1970s. Our juridical and political institutions were beginning to consolidate, and it felt as though peace, liberty, and economic growth would last forever.
My mother had been part of the student movement that helped overthrow the dictatorship in 1958, and in my eyes she embodied integrity, intellect, and justice. My father had an extraordinary library which, to me at the time, felt like the most vast and magical place in the world. He always encouraged me to read and discuss ideas. Both of my parents influenced me enormously.
Were there particular family or cultural traditions that played a lasting role in shaping your values or worldview?
I was also fortunate to be part of a large and loving extended family whose roots traced back to colonial times in the plains region (Los Llanos), with distinguished medical doctors, a governor, and lawyers among its members.
The most special figure for me was my aunt—my father’s sister—who was first a lawyer and later a painter. It was with her that I first visited Europe. Together with my cousin and grandmother, we embarked on an interrail journey across many European cities.
Looking back, this extended family represented a true privilege and a unique legacy of love and warmth. We celebrated all religious and cultural festivities together, along with countless birthdays. Llanero culture (akin to Argentine gaucho or cowboy traditions) is rich in music and poetry. At our gatherings, there was always someone reciting poems or dancing joropo to the rhythms of the harp, the cuatro (a four-string instrument), and maracas. Generations had preserved special food recipes for children’s birthday parties. It all felt deeply meaningful and unforgettable.
What initially drew you to the field you chose to study, and was there a moment when you realized it was the right path for you?
I was only fourteen when I began reading philosophy books from my father’s library. Among them were Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Descartes’s Meditations. I found both texts mysterious and fascinating. It felt as though their words contained a secret code I needed to decipher—one that held profound ideas capable of challenging my understanding of reality.
Reading philosophy and literature at such an early age led me to what I felt was my true calling. I was equally captivated by Ernesto Sabato’s The Tunnel and a biography of Simone de Beauvoir. I also read history and biographies of great historical figures, and at the time I did not see these as separate disciplines. For me, they formed part of a single, unified mystery—a deeply important conversation about life and human existence.
Later, in high school, these disciplines became more clearly separated. Although I knew I wanted to study philosophy, I pursued an undergraduate degree in law, influenced by my parents and what seemed the most logical path. I later continued my studies in philosophy. It was during my PhD research that I discovered the deep interconnections between legal, moral, and political philosophy. Since then, this field has become the passion of my life.
At what age did you begin working, and what did your first job teach you about responsibility or independence?
My first job was in the Venezuelan Parliament, where I worked as an assistant to the Parliamentary Media and Social Communications Commission. It was a fascinating role, involving research on freedom of speech, the implementation of legislation by government and institutions, and the prospects for future reform.
The environment was politically challenging, and I learned a great deal about people and the complexities of building a free society. At that stage, I was mostly an observer—a bystander watching political actors with great fascination.
How would you describe your current professional role, and what aspects of it do you find most meaningful?
I greatly enjoy engaging in research, presenting my work, and having conversations with colleagues and graduate students. Teaching is also deeply rewarding, especially witnessing how students who initially struggle with complex ideas begin to flourish and develop their own perspectives.
It is a genuine privilege to teach and to pursue intellectual work. I feel incredibly fortunate that each morning I wake up with a sense of excitement and enthusiasm for what I do.
How do you reconcile your account of normativity grounded in practical reason with the persistent worry that such accounts smuggle in substantive moral commitments under the guise of conceptual analysis?
The account of practical reason I defend is rooted in the classical tradition, particularly Aristotle’s conception. This approach distinguishes between, on the one hand, conceptual analysis—through which we theorise and examine the nature of what we seek to understand—and, on the other hand, practical reason. The latter concerns the “how” and “what” of our actions, engaging with the ways in which ends are realised within specific contexts and circumstances.
I have argued that legal directives—norms—are inherently connected to what is valuable. Legislative and judicial deliberation involves identifying the correct description of actions in terms of their “good-making” characteristics for citizens. In this sense, the view presupposes moral commitments; however, these cannot be articulated in advance in a rigid or formulaic way. Rather, they are shaped by context and by the exercise of practical reasoning.
Law is thus concerned with what is valuable, right, and good, but its application is mediated by our capacity for practical reasoning. This requires interpretation and contextual judgment, rather than the mechanical application of fixed formulas.
You have argued that law necessarily claims authority over practical reason rather than merely guiding behavior; how would your theory respond to cases where legal systems are systematically designed to bypass agents’ deliberative capacities through automation or coercive nudging?
This question goes to the heart of the issue. My response is that, in such cases, the law is defective. The key concern is whether the proliferation of automation or coercive nudging alters citizens’ self-understanding in relation to the legal system and its norms.
Since law claims authority over practical reason, it necessarily engages with how citizens understand themselves. Law shapes our values and the ways we relate to one another. If it bypasses citizens’ deliberative capacities, state coercion becomes arbitrary, lacking meaningful engagement with the citizen’s self-understanding.
In my recent book, Responsibility for Negligence in Ethics and Law: Aspiration, Perspective and Civic Maturity (OUP, 2025), I argue that negligence is rooted in akrasia and that the law of negligence promotes a form of proleptic thinking. It does so by framing values in ways that encourage citizens to adopt an aspirational and deliberative perspective, fostering civic maturity.
If the law bypasses practical reasoning and fails to engage with questions of value, it risks cultivating immature citizens—individuals who do not aspire to develop a richer deliberative perspective. Like love and friendship, law requires reflection, engagement, and an ongoing commitment to valuing what matters.
Your work places intentional action at the center of legal normativity; how does your framework handle structural injustices where outcomes are produced without any identifiable agent acting with the requisite intentions?
I have defended the view that intentional action runs parallel to our practical reasoning. This means that when we act intentionally, we perceive the end of the action “under the guise of the good.” Understanding this is a necessary starting point before we can grasp how we collectively and individually pursue what is good.
Structural injustice, however, presents an obstacle to achieving what is objectively good, both individually and collectively. I argue that only through the mediation of virtuous practical reason (phronesis) can we address and transform structural injustices, thereby achieving what is right and good. These two concepts are, in my view, deeply interconnected. One of the chapters in my recent book demonstrates the dependency between what is right—including justice—and the good. The central idea is that political communities transform structural injustice by engaging with both.
I am currently writing a book on how we can achieve the common good and clarify its nature. The common good is not something we grasp with complete clarity from the outset; rather, it is something we determine by establishing a dynamic relationship between means and ends. The end, as initially understood, is reshaped through the means we adopt, and vice versa. A society with minimal structural injustice is one in which citizens engage in virtuous practical reason oriented toward the common good.
Consider the example of legislators tasked with determining whether a particular public health system best promotes the overall health of the population, and with designing legislation to implement it. They must understand the “what” of the action—say, the health of the population—through the “how,” namely a series of concrete steps (a, b, a1, b1). The goal of “population health” is initially abstract and indeterminate, and can only be realised through specific means.
For instance, “a” might involve establishing infrastructure for the health system, while “b” concerns ensuring the long-term stability of care, including medical and nursing training. These, in turn, unfold into more specific actions: “a1” could involve designing and building hospitals, and “b1” could involve creating incentives for high-quality medical education. Understanding these concrete steps is essential to grasp the broader goal.
At the same time, understanding the health of the population requires attention to concrete realities—such as disease prevalence, disparities in access between rural and urban areas, levels of trust among minority groups, and the viability of preventative care. The “how” and the “what” illuminate one another.
This contrasts with a utilitarian conception that seeks to reduce such reasoning to a single metric, such as cost–benefit analysis, thereby simplifying health into a quantifiable utility. By contrast, the Aristotelian-inspired model of practical reasoning I defend is non-reductionist and oriented toward illuminating the common good. The good provides orientation, and the guiding question—“Is this good?”—directs our action.
In summary, I reject the view that structural injustice renders the achievement of what is right and good impossible. Even entrenched injustice can be addressed through collective virtuous practical reason. Law plays a central role in this process by shaping citizens and fostering their development into mature agents.
Many critics argue that Razian service conceptions of authority underestimate moral disagreement; to what extent does your critique of Raz succeed without collapsing into moral realism about reasons?
I accept that virtuous practical reason—that is, excellence in its exercise—presupposes a form of moral realism. This entails that there are right and wrong ways of acting, and good and evil forms of conduct.
However, this does not mean that we can grasp what is objectively good without mediation. We cannot apprehend the good independently of establishing a connection between the “how” (means) and the “what” (end) of action. It is always necessary to engage with the particular circumstances at hand and to reflect on why we desire a given end and what is required to realise it.
Thus, while my account acknowledges a realist dimension, it avoids collapsing into a simplistic or unmediated moral realism by emphasising the indispensable role of practical reasoning in shaping our understanding of value.
If law necessarily addresses agents as reason-responsive beings, what implications does this have for the criminal responsibility of individuals shaped by severe social deprivation?
The idea that human beings are responsive to reasons presupposes that our capacity for reasoning never entirely disappears, except in cases of significant physical or cognitive incapacity. Accordingly, even individuals shaped by severe social deprivation retain, at least in principle, the ability to engage with reasons and to orient themselves toward alternative courses of action.
This does not mean, however, that such engagement occurs under equal conditions. Severe deprivation can profoundly constrain the development and exercise of one’s rational capacities, shaping habits, expectations, and perceived possibilities in ways that make certain choices far more difficult than others. The challenge of overcoming these constraints reflects a fundamental feature of human life: the difficulty of revising ingrained dispositions and resisting the influence of one’s social environment.
Thus, while reason-responsiveness supports the attribution of criminal responsibility, it also calls for a more nuanced and context-sensitive understanding of it. Individuals formed under conditions of severe deprivation may still be responsible agents, but their responsibility is mitigated by the structural and developmental barriers that have limited their capacity to respond to reasons. Recognizing this tension invites a conception of criminal responsibility that remains grounded in agency while being attentive to the unequal conditions under which that agency is exercised.
If reasons for action are irreducibly normative, how do you address the challenge posed by experimental philosophy suggesting that ordinary agents often act without articulable reasons at all?
The “why-question” methodology aims to show that intentional action involves a structure of reasoning that unifies our bodily movements into an intelligible whole. At the same time, it allows for the possibility that we sometimes act “for no reason,” as in cases of compulsion.
The framework I defend is fully compatible with this. From the first-person perspective, intentional action presupposes that there is an answer—at least in principle—to the question, “Why are you doing this?” If the answer is “I have no reason” or “I cannot think of one,” then the action is not intentional.
Experimental philosophy, such as studies on the Knobe effect, shows that we tend to attribute intentionality to unintended side effects when the outcome is morally bad. In other words, moral judgment influences how we ascribe intentions. While this has important implications, a key point must be emphasised: practical reason operates from the first-person perspective.
We know what we are doing and why we are doing it from within our own deliberative standpoint. Others can only attribute intentionality by relying on our own description of the action. In Knobe-type cases, the agent did not intend the side effect, even if observers attribute responsibility from a third-person perspective. The issue, therefore, concerns attribution, moral judgment, and theories of responsibility—not a contradiction between experimental findings and normative accounts of action.
In my recent book, Responsibility for Negligence in Ethics and Law, I explore akrasia—a phenomenon in which agents fail to act as they intended. Even in such cases, agents remain engaged with reasons, but their character is not sufficiently aligned with their practical reasoning. This distinguishes akratic action from purely compulsive behaviour.
Can your account of legal normativity accommodate pluralistic societies in which citizens fundamentally disagree not only about values but about what counts as a reason?
This is a crucial issue. In pluralistic societies, engagement with reasons and values is indispensable. Citizens must engage with one another to determine the specific goods that collective action aims to realise.
This question is central to my current work on what I call “Socratic citizenship,” which I elaborate on further in the following sections.
How would you respond to the charge that grounding law in practical reason risks elitism, insofar as it privileges reflective, rational agency over other forms of human responsiveness?
In my current work, I argue that engaging in dialogue about specific subject matters—such as what constitutes a good health system or a good education—also involves the transformation of our emotions, desires, and character. Practical reasoning is not a purely abstract or intellectual exercise; it is deeply connected to our affective lives.
All human beings possess the capacity for deliberation through forms of Socratic dialogue. This makes the model fundamentally democratic. Such dialogical practices can be cultivated across all areas of social life—trade unions, schools, churches, and even playgrounds.
Human responses are never entirely “pure.” Even seemingly emotional reactions involve some level of thought, unless they are purely compulsive. Most of our actions are intentional, akratic, or virtuous, and they emerge from a history of reflection, experience, and desire.
Even in cases such as love, where one might claim to act purely from feeling, there is typically an underlying structure of thought—beliefs about the beloved’s qualities, for example—that can be articulated through reflection and dialogue. Thus, practical reasoning does not exclude emotional or relational forms of responsiveness; rather, it incorporates and refines them.
How does your theory of action and reasons engage with feminist critiques that emphasize power, dependency, and relational autonomy rather than individual deliberation?
The Socratic model of deliberation I am developing directly engages with these concerns. Through dialogue, we arrive at a conception of autonomy that I call “Socratic autonomy.” This form of autonomy emphasises self-knowledge and the shared pursuit of values.
Deliberation about what is good and right takes place collectively within a community, rather than at the level of isolated individuals. In this respect, my view aligns with the idea of relational autonomy, as it recognises the fundamentally social character of reasoning about values.
While relations of power and dependency undoubtedly exist, the key question is whether they can be transformed through collective dialogue oriented toward what is good and just. My account suggests that they can, at least in principle, through sustained engagement and shared deliberation.
To what extent can your conception of normativity survive a naturalistic challenge that seeks to explain reasons entirely in psychological or evolutionary terms?
It is certainly possible to explain human behaviour in purely psychological or evolutionary terms. However, such explanations are of limited help when we are faced with the practical question: “What should I do in these circumstances?”
Normativity retains a distinctive force. It requires that legal practice engage with questions of value—what is good, right, and just. Understanding legal decisions, therefore, cannot be reduced to scientific explanation alone; it requires moral and ethical reflection.
If we attempt to reduce normativity entirely to scientific terms, we risk losing the intelligibility of legal practice itself, along with its essential connection to human reasoning about value.