talks

BEYOND THE VERDICT

Credits: VID.

Credits: VID.

BEYOND THE VERDICT

Carola Lingaas
Professor of Law, VID Specialized University

Credits: VID.

Why was I interested in interviewing Carola? She is Professor of Law at VID Specialized University in Oslo, where her work focuses on international criminal law, international humanitarian law, human rights, and transitional justice. Her scholarship is distinguished by its interdisciplinary approach, drawing on law, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and visual culture to examine how legal systems respond to atrocity crimes, genocide, and collective violence. Through innovative research on topics ranging from the sensory dimensions of genocide and the role of metaphors in legal reasoning to Indigenous rights and the ethics of visual evidence, she challenges conventional legal thinking while remaining deeply committed to the principles of justice, humanity, and the rule of law.

In this wide-ranging conversation, Carola goes far beyond the technical language of international law to explore the human realities that often escape legal judgment. She reflects on the limits of criminal tribunals, the relationship between law and collective memory, humanitarian intervention, artificial intelligence in warfare, migration, international justice, and the moral authority of law in an increasingly fragmented world. Combining rigorous legal analysis with deeply personal reflections on privilege, empathy, education, failure, and hope, the interview offers a rare perspective on what justice can—and cannot—achieve, making it compelling reading for lawyers, policymakers, academics, and anyone interested in the future of international law and human dignity.

Here’s our exchange:

Where are you originally from, and what aspects of your childhood there most shaped who you are today?

I was born and raised in Switzerland to a Swiss mother and a Dutch father. I grew up in a village near Zürich. The stability and safety of my surroundings shaped me, although I only became fully aware of their significance as an adult, when I met individuals who had not been as fortunate as I was in terms of their upbringing, education, health, professional opportunities, and other aspects of life. As a young professional, I became acutely aware of my extremely privileged upbringing.

The first defining encounter happened at the District Court of Zürich, where I worked for a year after graduating from law school. During the criminal trial of a young man my own age, who had been indicted for a relatively minor crime, the judge asked him why he had never completed his compulsory schooling. He explained that he had needed to care for his sick single mother and his younger siblings. It struck me that this man, who had been born and raised in the same geographical area as I had, in the same wealthy country of Switzerland, with theoretically the same opportunities, had been dealt a much more difficult hand in life. Call it luck, destiny, or fate, but there are certain preconditions that influence who you are and what you can become.

The second encounter took place when I worked as a field delegate for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Southern Sudan. On one of our medical evacuation flights from the conflict area back to Lokichokio in northern Kenya was a woman who was also about my age. In her mid-twenties, she already had four children. She was experiencing obstructed labor and had been trying to deliver her baby for three days. The nearest health clinic was a two-day walk from her village, and apart from herbal remedies, no healthcare was available. She died before my eyes while trying to give birth. I felt completely powerless, guilty that I was unable to help, and enraged that, in the twenty-first century, chance could still determine whether someone lived or died.

These encounters left a profound impression on me. I consider myself extremely fortunate to have been born into a resourceful family in a prosperous country, where I had access to excellent healthcare, a high-quality education free of charge, and abundant professional opportunities, together with lasting stability in terms of the economy, social welfare, security, and politics. Never once during my upbringing did I have to worry about fundamental necessities. My life was predictable and secure. Meeting people who were not as fortunate simply because they had been born in the wrong place at the wrong time made me realize how arbitrary and unjust life can be. It also instilled in me a desire to contribute, however modestly, to righting these injustices.

How would you describe your family environment growing up, and who were the most influential figures in your early life?

My family environment reflected my surroundings: it was stable and secure. My parents had a traditional division of responsibilities. My mother was a stay-at-home mom who devoted herself to raising my brother and me, while my father was an independent management consultant who worked and traveled extensively. Looking back, I cannot identify a particular influential figure who served as a role model during my early years.

Were there particular family or cultural traditions that played a lasting role in shaping your values or worldview?

My parents took us on a holiday abroad every year. During my early childhood, these trips were to the Netherlands to visit my grandmother. Later, we traveled to more distant and exotic destinations, including Belize, Honduras, Egypt, and the Maldives, where the whole family enjoyed scuba diving together.

Experiencing and immersing myself in completely unfamiliar environments was fascinating. Those journeys instilled in me a lasting curiosity about different people, societies, cultures, and places. My parents broadened my worldview in a meaningful way. Moreover, my father had an extensive library and was always reading. Growing up surrounded by books undoubtedly contributed to my intellectual curiosity and my admiration for the written word. I still love physical books and sometimes struggle to relate to digital sources.

What initially drew you to the field you chose to study, and was there a moment when you realized it was the right path for you?

This will probably not be the answer you expect: I chose to study law because I did not know what else to study.

As a child, I was determined to become a paleontologist. Later, I wanted to study architecture, but I am a complete disaster when it comes to mathematics, calculations, and numbers in general, so I had to abandon that dream.

After graduating from high school, I was convinced that I would become a historian. I even chose Latin as an elective to fulfill the formal admission requirements of the University of Zürich. However, after attending two history lectures at the university, I was put off by how boring I found them. Perhaps I was simply unlucky with the topic or the lecturer, but it was enough to discourage me from pursuing history.

Instead, I chose law because it was considered a versatile degree that could open the door to many different careers. I was never particularly enthusiastic about my studies, but I graduated with good grades and within the prescribed timeframe. I often wonder whether I might have enjoyed university more had I chosen anthropology or sociology instead.

Only much later, in my late thirties, after working first as a lawyer at the District Court, then at the Public Prosecutor’s Office, later at a law firm, and subsequently for the Red Cross in various roles for more than seven years, did I develop a genuine interest in international criminal law. My passion for the discipline grew exponentially when I began my PhD, writing a dissertation entitled The Concept of Race in International Criminal Law. Today, I can hardly imagine a better profession than my own.

At what age did you begin working, and what did your first job teach you about responsibility or independence?

Beyond the regular household chores, I earned money by completing additional tasks for my parents, such as cleaning and polishing shoes or archiving newspaper articles relevant to my father’s work.

From the age of twelve or thirteen, I also held part-time and holiday jobs in grocery stores, warehouses, for a telephone marketing agency, and as a babysitter, among other roles. Throughout my university studies, I worked approximately 30% of the time for a bank.

Like most first jobs, these positions did not involve much individual responsibility. Instead, they taught me how to relate professionally to supervisors, colleagues, and customers, and how to function in a professional working environment. Above all, they taught me the importance of carrying out my work carefully, thoroughly, efficiently, and collaboratively.

How would you describe your current professional role, and what aspects of it do you find most meaningful?

Currently, I am a Professor of Law at VID Specialized University in Oslo, Norway. My time is divided approximately into 40% research and 60% teaching and administration.

The most meaningful aspect of my role is my interaction with students through teaching and supervision. I enjoy engaging with them and watching them gradually develop an understanding of the law, legal method, and legal scholarship. On a personal level, teaching is the most rewarding part of my work. From an academic perspective, supervising master’s students and PhD candidates is both stimulating and demanding, as it requires me to motivate them pedagogically to excel while developing into independent researchers.

Another very important aspect of my role is research. It is an enormous privilege to be able to read, study, reflect, and write about topics that genuinely interest me.

International criminal law often reduces human suffering into legal categories such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. What dimensions of violence do you think are inevitably lost in that process, and should courts be concerned about those losses?

International criminal law is only one normative framework through which crime and violence are addressed. As such, it regulates a very narrow dimension of violence, albeit a highly significant one: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are considered the gravest crimes because they cause unimaginable human suffering and destruction.

International criminal law serves several objectives, including deterrence, retribution and punishment, and redress. By regulating atrocities through predefined, narrowly delimited, and strictly interpreted legal categories, it inevitably overlooks many dimensions of violence.

From a strictly positivist perspective, one could argue that it is not the purpose of international criminal law to address every aspect of atrocity crimes comprehensively. There are important non-legal or soft-law mechanisms, such as transitional justice, that can facilitate the difficult transition from conflict to peace and promote reconciliation among communities.

At the same time, this division of responsibilities risks creating siloed perspectives, each with its own understanding of accountability and of how best to address disruptions to the international order.

From a victim-centered perspective, international criminal proceedings would benefit from placing greater emphasis on both the immediate and long-term consequences of atrocity crimes, rather than relegating those experiences to non-legal mechanisms or lengthy reparations processes. Even then, however, the outcome will inevitably remain incomplete. International criminal justice is, by its very nature, an incomplete system.

You have researched the olfactory dimensions of genocide—how survivors describe the smell of decomposing bodies and mass death. Can sensory experiences like smell ever become legally meaningful evidence, or are they destined to remain outside the language of law?

In my research, I seek to challenge prevailing perspectives on international criminal law and the work of international criminal tribunals.

In my chapter on the stench of genocide, I connect international criminal law with research in psychology, biology, and philosophy that explores the effects of decomposing bodies. There is a substantial body of morbid, yet fascinating, research that provides insights into the biological and psychological responses to unpleasant smells and their consequences for group identity, including the dehumanization of “the other.”

For example, smell is a much more powerful trigger of memory than vision, yet courts rely predominantly on visual evidence. At the same time, visual memory is notoriously unreliable, as extensive research from both domestic and international criminal proceedings has demonstrated.

Courts, bound by legal principles and evidentiary rules, are understandably reluctant to rely on extra-legal insights or on evidence such as emotions or smells that cannot easily be preserved, reproduced, or objectively verified. However, by focusing narrowly on the written law, courts risk overlooking highly relevant aspects of criminal conduct: how witnesses experienced atrocities, what their sensory perceptions reveal about the crimes, and how these sensory memories continue to affect post-conflict reconciliation.

If these perspectives are not given sufficient space in legal proceedings, they risk trivializing victims’ lived experiences, which, in turn, may undermine the legitimacy of both the court and its proceedings.

I make a similar argument regarding the use of metaphors. Victims often depend on metaphors to make sense of violence. I have researched the “butcher” metaphor, which appears repeatedly across different conflicts, historical periods, and cultures. The frequent use of the term “butcher” to describe excessive violence in armed conflict and genocide suggests a shared understanding that should also be reflected in legal reasoning.

Unsurprisingly, courts tend to avoid engaging with metaphors in their legal analyses. I argue that they should pay greater attention to them because metaphors matter not only socially but also legally. When victims use metaphors to describe their experiences, they can provide legally relevant information about the violence they endured—for example, whether it was disproportionate or discriminatory.

For that reason, it is difficult to understand why courts do not pay greater attention to metaphorical descriptions of criminal conduct.

Legal recognition matters enormously to survivors. But does defining suffering through legal categories inevitably create hierarchies, where some victims are officially recognized while others remain legally invisible?

The hierarchies are not created by the law itself, because the law does not establish a hierarchy between genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Legally speaking, there is no hierarchy of suffering. However, in the public imagination, genocide continues to be perceived as “the crime of crimes,” thereby creating an implicit hierarchy of victimhood.

It is deeply problematic that some groups feel they must compete for a particular legal classification in order to feel acknowledged as “real” victims. This perception implies that victims of crimes against humanity or war crimes have somehow suffered less, which is neither the intention of the law nor of the judiciary.

On the contrary, this hierarchical understanding undermines several objectives of international criminal justice, including the prevention of future violence. If only victims of genocide are regarded as the “true” victims, group divisions are unlikely ever to disappear. Instead of promoting reconciliation, such perceptions risk perpetuating intergroup conflict.

The Balkans illustrate this problem well. Some Serbs continue to express resentment over what they perceive as the international community’s failure to recognize them as victims of a Croatian genocide, while others celebrate individuals convicted of genocide as national heroes.

Judgments of international tribunals often become the authoritative version of history. Does this place too much power in the hands of judges to shape collective memory, especially when legal standards of proof differ from historical methods?

The notion that judicial decisions create the authoritative version of history has, in my view, been convincingly challenged.

This expectation places an unrealistic burden on courts and reflects a misunderstanding of both legal proceedings and the limits of the law. Courts apply narrowly defined legal rules to narrowly defined cases before them. Their role is not to write history.

I therefore do not believe judges possess excessive power in this regard, since their judgments are generally confined to the facts of a particular case and the applicable law. What is perhaps more interesting is the influence that the narratives emerging from judgments may have on collective memory.

At the same time, we should not underestimate the legal and social importance of trials in establishing a shared understanding of what has occurred. However, it remains essential to recognize that legal methods differ fundamentally from historical methods. Legal justice, with its focus on the criminal responsibility of specific individuals, is not the same as historical justice.

Courts judge only the criminal conduct of the accused before them—nothing more.

That said, I must admit that judgments containing unusually candid dissenting opinions often make for fascinating reading because they illuminate the reasoning behind the majority’s supposedly “objective” conclusions from an entirely different perspective. Interestingly, some dissenting opinions have become widely cited and, over time, have even acquired an authoritative status in legal scholarship and judicial reasoning.

Suppose an international tribunal reaches a legally impeccable judgment, but survivors feel that their lived experience was never truly acknowledged. From a sociolegal perspective, has justice been achieved, or does justice require something that the law alone cannot provide?

This question ties together the three previous questions and answers very well. Law can never be the sole answer. It is always part of a much larger picture. Consequently, judgments may achieve legal justice, but they cannot achieve complete justice.

This connects to the much broader philosophical debate about the nature of justice. Without venturing too deeply into that discussion, it is sufficient to say that legal justice alone is rarely capable of creating the conditions necessary for lasting peace, reconciliation, or stability. At the same time, legal justice is often an essential part of a victim’s process of moving forward after armed conflict and violence. This demonstrates that trials matter greatly to victims, even if they cannot always deliver everything victims hope they will.

To answer your question directly: justice certainly requires more than the law alone can provide, but the law remains an indispensable piece of the post-conflict transition. Other equally important elements include reparations, truth and reconciliation commissions, other transitional justice mechanisms, memorialization, atrocity prevention, and political, institutional, and social reforms. The law cannot accomplish all of these objectives by itself.

I would also like to highlight another aspect of legal justice that I discuss in my research on Indigenous legal issues. Even when legal justice has been achieved and victims are satisfied with the outcome, judgments must still be implemented in order to have practical effect. If implementation is delayed, obstructed, or ignored, legal justice itself is undermined. This ultimately touches upon the very foundations of the separation of powers, judicial independence, and democracy.

Legal proceedings tend to privilege what can be documented, corroborated, and classified. How does international criminal law deal with experiences that are deeply real to victims but resist legal proof, such as fear, humiliation, or the psychological atmosphere of persecution?

Together with my good friend and colleague, Dr. Aleksandra Bartoszko, a social anthropologist by training, I recently explored this question in an as-yet unpublished article, although from the perspective of perpetrators’ experiences of pleasure.

We analyzed statements made by perpetrators of mass violence, working from the hypothesis that some perpetrators might express pride in their crimes or even boast about them before criminal courts. In particular, we expected to encounter statements revealing pleasure derived from torture, sadistic violence against victims—especially prisoners—and sexual violence.

Our research focused on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and we were surprised to find only a small number of statements in which perpetrators openly expressed pleasure in wartime violence. This can partly be explained by the nature of criminal proceedings themselves: self-incrimination is rarely an effective legal strategy. Another explanation lies in the courtroom setting. Being accused of committing grave atrocities carries a powerful social stigma that most defendants understandably seek to avoid.

What proved particularly interesting was that most accounts describing perpetrators’ enjoyment of violence came not from the perpetrators themselves, but from victims, witnesses, or other third parties. By observing perpetrators, these individuals interpreted what they believed to be the perpetrators’ emotions, whether pleasure, fear, humiliation, or otherwise.

Since such emotions are deeply personal and ultimately known only to the individuals experiencing them, no one else can fully understand or accurately translate those internal states. From a legal perspective, this becomes problematic if courts place excessive reliance on witness interpretations of another person’s emotional experience when assessing criminal responsibility.

Having worked with the Rwandan genocide archive and visual representations of detainees at Guantánamo, how do you navigate the ethical tension between preserving evidence for justice and avoiding the repeated objectification of victims and prisoners?

That is an excellent—and difficult—question.

As you can infer from my previous answer, one can also be critical of research that focuses on perpetrators. There is an undeniable tension between conducting impartial research and giving perpetrators of atrocity crimes a voice. The danger lies in amplifying perpetrators’ perspectives while unintentionally diminishing those of victims.

This relates directly to your point about the objectification of victims. As researchers, we have an obligation to remain impartial, even when confronted with horrific crimes, structural violence, power imbalances, and profound human suffering. At the same time, impartiality does not prevent us from identifying and critically analyzing these phenomena.

Although it is not always comfortable, engaging with controversial or difficult subjects is precisely what makes research meaningful. It also allows us to develop new perspectives that may ultimately have practical value, even if there is always a risk that research findings can be misunderstood or misused.

Your work on portraits of detainees at Guantánamo raises an interesting question: photographs can humanize, but they can also reduce people to objects of observation. How should courts and researchers use visual material without unintentionally reinforcing the very dehumanization they seek to expose?

I will focus primarily on the use of visual material by researchers.

My general position is that if an image has already been published—for example, in a publicly accessible judgment, newspaper, book, or on the internet—it is already part of the public domain. If I subsequently reproduce that image in my research, I am merely creating one additional place where it can be found.

That said, I would make two observations.

First, I fully acknowledge the danger of reinforcing problematic narratives or negative representations, particularly when dealing with controversial topics or sensitive visual material.

Second, I doubt that my own research reaches such a broad audience that it would significantly influence processes of dehumanization or public representation. Admittedly, that may be a somewhat naïve observation, and it certainly does not solve the underlying ethical problem.

These challenges are not unique to my field. Researchers working on drug addiction, juvenile incarceration, child sexual abuse, online pornography, child protection, and many other sensitive topics face similar dilemmas. Visual material may intensify these ethical concerns, but in my opinion, it does not fundamentally alter their nature.

Whenever one researches sensitive subjects, ethical dilemmas are unavoidable. The responsibility lies in approaching them thoughtfully and with great care.

Accountability for atrocity crimes has evolved through the International Criminal Court and ad hoc tribunals, but many perpetrators walk free. What is missing in the legal architecture that allows this?

The legal architecture encompasses both the international legal system and domestic or regional judicial systems.

While one may certainly criticize the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court (ICC), I remain deeply convinced that the world needs a permanent international criminal court. The ICC has issued arrest warrants against several sitting heads of state, and these warrants themselves possess significant deterrent value.

We should not underestimate the legal, symbolic, and societal importance of having a supranational institution capable of prosecuting those who bear the greatest responsibility for atrocity crimes.

At the same time, the ICC was never intended to prosecute every perpetrator. Under the principle of complementarity, the primary responsibility for prosecuting international crimes remains with national courts, while the ICC functions as a court of last resort.

An effective legal architecture therefore depends upon both functioning domestic judicial systems and a robust international judiciary, alongside mechanisms that enable societies to reconcile. Transitional justice should not be viewed as separate from criminal justice but rather as an integral component of an effective and restorative legal system.

How do you assess the current effectiveness of international law in constraining state behaviour when great powers routinely violate foundational norms without meaningful consequences?

Unfortunately, there is no straightforward answer to this question.

The great powers violate far too many binding legal rules and rarely suffer meaningful legal consequences. At the same time, they continue to invoke legal norms in their political discourse and frequently use international law to justify their own conduct.

This suggests that international law still matters to them, despite their selective compliance.

Non-compliance should not automatically be equated with ineffectiveness. I do not believe international law as a normative framework is any less effective today than it was in previous decades. Rather, international law has always experienced periods of backlash while simultaneously continuing to evolve through the work of courts and through changing understandings among states, individuals, and international organizations.

What does affect public confidence is the perceived weakness or inefficiency of institutions such as the International Criminal Court or the United Nations. Here, however, I believe it is important to distinguish between international law as a normative system and the institutions responsible for applying—or sometimes failing to apply—that law.

The International Court of Justice and other tribunals issue judgments that are legally compelling but politically unenforced. What does this say about the authority of international law in a world where power often trumps principle?

Law—and international law in particular—is closely intertwined with politics. This relationship is both its greatest strength and one of its greatest weaknesses.

For individuals directly affected by human rights violations, armed conflict, or genocide, the disregard of legally binding judgments or authoritative statements by international tribunals can be devastating. After enduring sustained and severe violations of their rights, victims often place their hopes in responses from the United Nations or international courts. When those responses are openly ignored, confidence in the authority of the law is inevitably damaged.

At the same time, the fact that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is currently experiencing something of a renaissance and has increasingly become the preferred legal forum for interstate disputes suggests that international law continues to command considerable authority.

Even states that blatantly violate international law appear before the ICJ represented by highly skilled legal teams, demonstrating both respect for the Court and recognition of the importance of international law itself.

We should also remember that states comply with international law not only because they acknowledge its authority but because stable international relations—including trade—depend upon it.

In your view, where does international law most fundamentally fail to reckon with structural inequality between states, and how could it be reformed to address that imbalance?

Like many others, I struggle with the current structure of the United Nations Security Council, which largely reflects the distribution of power after the Second World War.

Today, the composition of the Council and the veto powers of its permanent members are neither representative of the world’s population nor reflective of contemporary geopolitical realities. Nor are they particularly effective.

The UN Charter assigns too many crucial decisions to the Security Council, which is frequently unable to act because of geopolitical rivalries and the use of the veto.

In this way, the Security Council reinforces structural inequalities among states while simultaneously limiting the effective implementation of the UN Charter.

The law of humanitarian intervention remains deeply contested. Should legality be contingent on consent, on outcomes, or some combination—and who gets to decide?

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle remains contested precisely for the reasons you identify: who decides, and what should be the threshold for intervention?

Another problematic aspect is the politicization of the principle and the implementation of interventions. If the decision is left solely to the powerful, there is an obvious risk of bias. If no one intervenes, however, there is an even greater risk of widespread human suffering and loss of life.

In my view, it is also problematic that different organizations, such as the United Nations and NATO, may interpret the principle differently. Such divergent interpretations risk leading to inconsistent application and, ultimately, unequal treatment of comparable situations.

Cyber operations create ambiguity around aggression, attribution, and proportionality. How well-equipped is international law to regulate state behaviour in cyberspace?

I am not an expert on cyberspace or cyber warfare and therefore do not possess sufficient expertise to comment extensively on their particular characteristics.

However, I do see that autonomous weapons systems and artificial intelligence challenge both the existing law of armed conflict and international criminal law, particularly regarding the attribution of individual criminal responsibility.

I believe the law will either have to be adapted or interpreted more broadly in order to encompass these emerging methods of warfare.

That said, international humanitarian law has existed for centuries, and modern international humanitarian law has successfully adapted to numerous technological developments over the past decades. This gives me reason to hope that the existing legal framework will remain sufficiently flexible to regulate cyberspace, autonomous systems, and future technological innovations.

Lawfare is increasingly used as a tool of strategic pressure. To what extent does this weaponize international law itself, and what can be done to protect the integrity of legal norms?

Lawfare is an interesting concept because it appears to have at least two distinct dimensions. On the one hand, it may refer to the misuse of legal norms for the benefit of powerful actors. On the other, it may describe the strategic use of litigation by marginalized communities seeking recognition and protection of their rights before courts.

Although I have not conducted research specifically on lawfare, I do not consider it problematic as long as judicial systems remain independent and fully functional. If courts adjudicate strategic litigation impartially and independently, lawfare can contribute to the development of the law and strengthen the rights of individuals and groups—something particularly important in the context of Indigenous peoples.

Even if lawfare is understood as a form of “weaponization,” its outcomes may nevertheless advance legal protections and expand rights. For minority communities, lawfare can be a costly and risky strategy, but one capable of producing significant legal and social progress.

From my perspective, the integrity of legal norms is therefore not fundamentally threatened.

The migration crisis has exposed gaps in refugee law and burden-sharing. Do you see a path toward a more equitable and enforceable global framework, or is sovereignty too entrenched?

Neither refugee law nor migration falls within my primary area of expertise.

In my opinion, many of the current crises have resulted from the interaction of overlapping legal regimes, including United Nations treaties, European Union law, and domestic immigration legislation.

Sovereignty certainly remains deeply entrenched, as demonstrated by developments within the European Union, where both external and internal borders have created enormous challenges for migrants.

Yet, as always, the law does not operate in isolation. It is deeply intertwined with politics, history, economics, culture, and public sentiment. Legal analysis therefore cannot be separated from these broader contexts, including anti-immigration attitudes and the lack of solidarity both within and between states.

For that reason, I am not convinced that the principal problem lies in an insufficient global legal framework or in sovereignty itself. Rather, I believe international law alone cannot resolve the migration crisis. Considerations of humanity and solidarity with others must remain central to the policies and actions of every state.

Can international law realistically aspire to moral authority without a corresponding global enforcement mechanism, and if not, what alternative vision should legal scholars embrace?

The fundamental purposes of international law are to prevent conflict, uphold peace and justice, and protect human rights. These objectives themselves provide international law with moral authority.

That authority is undoubtedly challenged when the law cannot be effectively enforced. Because much of international law depends upon state consent and implementation, its legitimacy suffers whenever states refuse to comply with legal obligations or disregard the authority of international courts and tribunals.

Nevertheless, even in the absence of comprehensive global enforcement mechanisms, international law retains significant moral authority.

States continue to negotiate, conclude, and comply with both multilateral and bilateral treaties. Their conduct frequently aligns with treaty obligations, while violations are challenged through the various mechanisms available under treaty law and customary international law. Although the international legal system is undoubtedly imperfect, I do not believe an entirely new vision is necessary.

Has there been a book, film, or work of art that significantly influenced the way you see the world or think about your work?

Where should I begin?

I am in the extraordinarily privileged position of being able to read—and write—for a living. Many books, and some films, have left a profound and lasting impression on me, particularly those dealing with the Second World War, the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, and other armed conflicts.

Although many of these works are not directly related to my own research, they have nurtured my enduring interest in the field.

There are far too many to mention, but the following have been particularly influential:

  • Edward Said, Orientalism (on othering and imagined communities)
  • Han Kang, Human Acts (on the Gwangju Uprising in South Korea)
  • André Brink, The Other Side of Silence (on German South West Africa, now Namibia)
  • Erich Maria Remarque, The Night in Lisbon (on the Second World War)
  • Primo Levi, If This Is a Man and The Truce (on the Nazi concentration camps)
  • Philippe Sands, East West Street (on Lauterpacht and Lemkin)
  • Gil Courtemanche, A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali (on the Rwandan genocide)
  • Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason (on humanitarianism)
  • Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (on the post-war trial of Adolf Eichmann)

Among films, The Zone of Interest, about Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Höss, and The Pianist, about the Warsaw Ghetto, have deeply affected me.

I also greatly enjoy A Room with a View and Out of Africa, although they are less directly connected to my academic work.

I have always loved art and spend a great deal of time in museums, particularly those devoted to modern art. Since childhood, I have been especially inspired by Piet Mondrian, Joan Miró, and Wassily Kandinsky.

I am still searching for a research question that would allow me to combine my interest in modernism with international criminal law.

Looking at younger generations today, what gives you the greatest sense of hope, and what concerns you the most?

I have mixed feelings.

I grew up in a region characterized by remarkable prosperity, political and social stability, development, and—perhaps most importantly—relative peace.

In Northern and Western Europe, today’s younger generations have become even more accustomed to these conditions: high-quality education, low unemployment, functioning public institutions, relatively low crime, and extensive personal freedoms. My greatest concern is that many may take these achievements for granted.

I worry that they may not fully appreciate how fragile genuine democracies are, or how important it is to protect them.

At times, I have the impression that younger generations are becoming more individualistic and less politically engaged. There is a risk that they may pay too little attention to the functioning of the state, the independence of the judiciary, and the importance of democratic and representative institutions—until it is too late.

At the same time, what gives me hope is their deep capacity for humanity and compassion. My hope is that, when the fundamental pillars of society are threatened, they will draw upon those qualities to defend and preserve them.

If you could spend a full day with any historical figure, who would you choose, and what questions would you want to ask them?

While it is tempting to answer Nelson Mandela, Rosa Luxemburg, Eleanor Roosevelt, or another well-known historical figure, I would actually prefer to spend the day with one of the participants in the Nuremberg Trials, where the Nazi leadership was prosecuted.

I would be particularly interested in speaking with Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide and lobbied unsuccessfully for its inclusion in the legal framework applied at Nuremberg. Although he did not succeed at the time, the crime was later codified in the 1948 Genocide Convention.

I would also enjoy talking with the British prosecutors Hartley Shawcross and David Maxwell Fyfe. I would ask them how they prepared for a criminal trial when both the applicable law and its interpretation were so new and largely untested. I would also be fascinated to learn how they investigated the crimes and established the responsibility of individual perpetrators, and how they—and the judges—balanced the fundamental requirement of a fair and impartial trial against the enormous public expectation that convictions would follow.

If you were asked to teach a class on a subject completely unrelated to your profession, what would it be, and what would you hope students take away from it?

This sounds like a nightmare!

Teaching always requires extensive preparation, and teaching a subject completely unrelated to my profession would demand weeks of reading. Even then, after you have prepared thoroughly and feel ready to face a classroom full of curious and critical students, someone will inevitably ask that one unexpected question for which you have no answer.

I imagine that would be deeply uncomfortable when teaching a subject outside one’s expertise.

If I had to choose, the subject would be twentieth-century architecture. Above all, I would hope that the students left the classroom realizing that professors are only human beings and do not have the answers to everything.

If you could ensure that one human value is never lost in society, which value would you choose, and why?

I would choose respect for our shared humanity, which also happens to be one of the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law.

One could also describe it as compassion or empathy. It lies at the heart of human dignity and mutual respect.

Recognizing our common humanity and treating others as equals are essential both for preventing conflict and for rebuilding societies once conflict has ended.

Humanity is facing radical changes. To name just ten: geopolitical instability, climate change, economic inequalities, technological risks, public health challenges, political polarization, resource scarcity, humanitarian crises, misinformation, and disparities in global healthcare access. If, in an imaginative exercise, you had the power to solve one of these problems, which one would you choose first and why?

All of these challenges are interconnected and reinforce one another.

I would probably begin by addressing economic inequality because I believe it lies at the root of many of the other problems. If greater economic equality could be achieved, many of the remaining challenges would, I hope, either diminish significantly or become easier to address.

What do you believe human beings owe one another, both as individuals and as members of a global society?

This question brings me back to one of my earlier answers: we owe one another respect for our shared humanity.

As individuals and as members of society, we should treat one another with dignity, respect, and solidarity, without dividing people into competing or opposing groups.

Interviews often focus on successes. Could you share something from 2025 that did not unfold as you expected, and what that experience taught you?

As academics, we become accustomed to experiencing failure—or, perhaps more accurately, the absence of success. Genuine success stories are comparatively rare.

Professionally, 2025 brought several disappointments: rejected journal articles, unsuccessful conference abstracts, delays in publication, unsuccessful research grant applications, and a high percentage of students failing their examinations, among others. The list could easily go on.

Over time, one develops a somewhat thicker skin, making these setbacks easier to bear. They remain painful, but one gradually learns to put them aside and move forward.

It is also important to remind ourselves that academia is a profession, not a lifestyle, although the boundary between the two is often blurred.

Are there any personal or professional goals you feel comfortable sharing for 2026?

Professionally, I am currently working on several genuinely exciting research projects and very much look forward to reading, researching, and writing, both independently and in collaboration with intelligent, supportive, and enjoyable colleagues.

It is a real privilege to explore new questions, develop original ideas, and contribute to scholarly work together with others.

At the same time, every project comes with deadlines, which inevitably add considerable pressure to what is already a very busy schedule over the coming months—not to mention that writer’s block and procrastination are very real challenges.

When you imagine the final moments of your life, what kind of news would you most hope to hear, and why?

As a mother, I hope the news would concern my daughters and all the generations that follow them.

More than anything, I would hope to hear that there are no longer any armed conflicts anywhere in the world.